

7

, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum
R2B-175, November 1, 1962

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Roger Hillsman

SUBJECT: Moscow's Current Goal: Minimize Inspection --
Maximize Assurances For Castro

Latest developments -- including the Soviet assurance to U Thant that the missiles in Cuba will be dismantled by November 2 -- suggest that Moscow still means to go through with the basic provisions of the Kennedy-Khrushchev arrangement, but that in doing so it will seek to keep verification to a minimum while obtaining maximum further guarantees for Castro.

This paper briefly summarizes the latest developments and assesses their significance. It is written on the assumption that U Thant has been accurately informed of Soviet intentions -- an assumption which cannot be confirmed at least until the results of today's reconnaissance flights are in.

* * * * *

The Soviet plan to dismantle missile bases by tomorrow can, if actually implemented, put the USSR in an optimum negotiating position to resist US pressures on questions connected with verification while demanding more in the way of US assurances to the Castro regime.

1. Soviet Schedule for Dismantling Sites

In Havana, Soviet General Stazenko informed U Thant and General Rikhye that orders to begin dismantling had been received in Cuba between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m. on Sunday, October 28, and that work began at 5:00 p.m. (this is not confirmed nor necessarily disproven by our own reconnaissance on Monday). Missiles and major equipment will be removed from the sites by tomorrow and bulldozing of the sites will begin then. In New York, Kuznetsov told McCloy yesterday that the dismantling of "relevant facilities" would be completed either November 2 or 3.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Kuznetsov said he did not know the precise details of what dismantling would entail. While no mention was made of aircraft, the Secretary General in Havana had the impression that all of the equipment in the hands of the Soviet military would be withdrawn together with the Soviet personnel. TASS published U Thant's public statement that he had been reliably informed of the dismantling of the missile sites.

2. Aerial Reconnaissance Discouraged

At the same time both the Soviets and the Cubans attempted to discourage US or UN aerial reconnaissance. When told that the US would resume reconnaissance today, and that a dangerous situation would arise if surveillance planes were shot at or downed, Kuznetsov replied that all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba were in Cuban hands. In Havana, Castro strongly opposed aerial reconnaissance of any kind as well as inspection on Cuban soil.

3. Implications for Further Negotiations

The Soviet timetable outlined above refers to the dismantling of the equipment, and not to its return to the USSR. Once having carried it out, the Soviets would regard themselves in a strong position for further negotiations.

- They would have made a forthcoming gesture to which world opinion would expect the US to respond.

- Their reputation for probity, badly damaged by American evidence of their secretive installation of the missiles, would at least in part be restored and the US rationale for demanding strict controls would be undercut.

- Meanwhile the crisis would appear to world opinion to have receded, and the pressure on the USSR to meet US demands would be reduced.

- At the same time, the Soviet missiles though in storage rather than on launchers would still be in Cuba and Moscow would still have bargaining value.

4. Quarantine

Kuznetsov already indicated the form of such bargaining yesterday when he observed to McCloy that the length of time required for shipping the equipment back to the USSR would

depend on the availability of shipping which in turn would depend on the US position with respect to the quarantine. The persuasiveness of Kuznetsov's line of reasoning is perhaps illustrated by the Secretary General's statement last night to Ambassador Stevenson that he believed that the "blockade" was no longer necessary.

However, Kuznetsov did not oppose Red Cross (ICRC) inspection of incoming shipping to Cuba, and even Castro acquiesced in inspection of ships at sea (but not in Cuba).

5. Verification

The Soviets apparently hope that by implementing half of the first phase of the removal without verification, they will be able to minimize US demands for further verification. The Soviets will almost certainly seek to reduce to a minimum the controls required in order to:

- (1) reduce Cuban opposition,
- (2) avoid setting a precedent which might be used against them in disarmament negotiations, and
- (3) prevent the further US intelligence gain that would result from observation of the act of dismantling.

However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets may invite UN representatives to witness the bulldozing of revetments in order to vividly demonstrate their fulfillment of their part of the bargain. In so doing they would hope to convey the impression that such measures as inspection of other locations, inspection of the actual movement out of Cuba, overflights and continuing control over possible reintroduction of Soviet missiles were unnecessary.

6. Guarantees for Cuba

Kuznetsov indicated that Moscow will seek further US guarantees for the Castro regime. He suggested that to give substance to the assurance that no invasion will take place from the US or a Latin American country, there ought to be a guarantee that no invasion preparations were occurring and that there would be no subversive activities directed against Cuba whether in the US or in other Latin American countries.

Meanwhile Moscow propaganda continues playing up the theme of danger to Cuba, alleging US bad faith in the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of letters, and supporting Castro's five demands. Polyakov, Izvestiya's authoritative

commentator, said on October 31 that fulfillment of these demands is necessary to guarantee Cuba's security.

7. Mikoyan Trip

Castro remained adamant in his opposition to all forms of inspection on Cuban territory, and indicated to U Thant that he had been embittered by Khrushchev's sending his October 28 letter to the President without first consulting him.

Mikoyan is en route to Cuba, apparently to cajole Castro into agreeing to an arrangement which the US might accept. Inclusion of Alikhanov (Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations) on the delegation suggests that additional economic aid may be forthcoming. References in Soviet propaganda to the effect that the USSR will not leave Cuba undefended suggest the possibility that Mikoyan may offer the Cubans a formal alliance; however, on balance it appears doubtful that Castro would value such an assurance at a time when he feels betrayed, or that the Soviets want to deepen and further formalize their military commitment.

EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS

1007
3

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEWED BY *A. K.* [illegible] INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

30-~~XXXXXXXXXX~~. DATE 04/16
 TO ADV. AMERICAN JACOBSON (S) LEW
 ENDORSE ELF.ING MARKINGS □
 SEAL 1967-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 1975-1976 1976-1977 1977-1978 1978-1979 1979-1980 1980-1981 1981-1982 1982-1983 1983-1984 1984-1985 1985-1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 1988-1989 1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 2018-2019 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 2024-2025 2025-2026 2026-2027 2027-2028 2028-2029 2029-2030 2030-2031 2031-2032 2032-2033 2033-2034 2034-2035 2035-2036 2036-2037 2037-2038 2038-2039 2039-2040 2040-2041 2041-2042 2042-2043 2043-2044 2044-2045 2045-2046 2046-2047 2047-2048 2048-2049 2049-2050 2050-2051 2051-2052 2052-2053 2053-2054 2054-2055 2055-2056 2056-2057 2057-2058 2058-2059 2059-2060 2060-2061 2061-2062 2062-2063 2063-2064 2064-2065 2065-2066 2066-2067 2067-2068 2068-2069 2069-2070 2070-2071 2071-2072 2072-2073 2073-2074 2074-2075 2075-2076 2076-2077 2077-2078 2078-2079 2079-2080 2080-2081 2081-2082 2082-2083 2083-2084 2084-2085 2085-2086 2086-2087 2087-2088 2088-2089 2089-2090 2090-2091 2091-2092 2092-2093 2093-2094 2094-2095 2095-2096 2096-2097 2097-2098 2098-2099 2099-2100 2100-2101 2101-2102 2102-2103 2103-2104 2104-2105 2105-2106 2106-2107 2107-2108 2108-2109 2109-2110 2110-2111 2111-2112 2112-2113 2113-2114 2114-2115 2115-2116 2116-2117 2117-2118 2118-2119 2119-2120 2120-2121 2121-2122 2122-2123 2123-2124 2124-2125 2125-2126 2126-2127 2127-2128 2128-2129 2129-2130 2130-2131 2131-2132 2132-2133 2133-2134 2134-2135 2135-2136 2136-2137 2137-2138 2138-2139 2139-2140 2140-2141 2141-2142 2142-2143 2143-2144 2144-2145 2145-2146 2146-2147 2147-2148 2148-2149 2149-2150 2150-2151 2151-2152 2152-2153 2153-2154 2154-2155 2155-2156 2156-2157 2157-2158 2158-2159 2159-2160 2160-2161 2161-2162 2162-2163 2163-2164 2164-2165 2165-2166 2166-2167 2167-2168 2168-2169 2169-2170 2170-2171 2171-2172 2172-2173 2173-2174 2174-2175 2175-2176 2176-2177 2177-2178 2178-2179 2179-2180 2180-2181 2181-2182 2182-2183 2183-2184 2184-2185 2185-2186 2186-2187 2187-2188 2188-2189 2189-2190 2190-2191 2191-2192 2192-2193 2193-2194 2194-2195 2195-2196 2196-2197 2197-2198 2198-2199 2199-2200 2200-2201 2201-2202 2202-2203 2203-2204 2204-2205 2205-2206 2206-2207 2207-2208 2208-2209 2209-2210 2210-2211 2211-2212 2212-2213 2213-2214 2214-2215 2215-2216 2216-2217 2217-2218 2218-2219 2219-2220 2220-2221 2221-2222 2222-2223 2223-2224 2224-2225 2225-2226 2226-2227 2227-2228 2228-2229 2229-2230 2230-2231 2231-2232 2232-2233 2233-2234 2234-2235 2235-2236 2236-2237

Research Memorandum
RSE-175, November 1, 1962

FROM: : INR - Roger Hillsman

SUBJECT: Moscow's Current Goal: Minimize Inspection --
Maximize Assurances for Castro

Latest developments -- including the Soviet assurance to U Thant that the missiles in Cuba will be dismantled by November 2 -- suggest that Moscow still means to go through with the basic provisions of the Kennedy-Khrushchev arrangement, but that in doing so it will seek to keep verification to a minimum while obtaining maximum further guarantees for Castro.

... This paper briefly summarizes the latest developments and assesses their significance. It is written on the assumption that U Thant has been accurately informed of Soviet intentions -- an assumption which cannot be confirmed at least until the results of today's reconnaissance flights are in.

• • • • •

The Soviet plan to dismantle missile bases by tomorrow can, if actually implemented, put the USSR in an optimum negotiating position to resist US pressures on questions connected with verification while demanding more in the way of US assurances to the Castro regime.

1. Soviet Schedule for Dismantling Sites

In Havana, Soviet General Stazenko informed U Thant and General Rikhye that orders to begin dismantling had been received in Cuba between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m. on Sunday, October 28, and that work began at 5:00 p.m. (this is not confirmed nor necessarily disproven by our own reconnaissance on Monday). Missiles and major equipment will be removed from the sites by tomorrow and bulldozing of the sites will begin then.

SECRET

066

01345297030

DECLASSIFIED

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

[REDACTED] While no mention was made of aircraft, the Secretary General in Havana had the impression that all of the equipment in the hands of the Soviet military would be withdrawn together with the Soviet personnel. TASS published U Thant's public statement that he had been reliably informed of the dismantling of the missile sites. b7c b7d

2. Aerial Reconnaissance Discouraged

[REDACTED] In Havana, Castro strongly opposed aerial reconnaissance of any kind as well as inspection on Cuban soil. b7c b7d

3. Implications for Further Negotiations

The Soviet timetable outlined above refers to the dismantling of the equipment, and not to its return to the USSR. Once having carried it out, the Soviets would regard themselves in a strong position for further negotiations.

- They would have made a forthcoming gesture to which world opinion would expect the US to respond.

- Their reputation for probity, badly damaged by American evidence of their secretive installation of the missiles, would at least in part be restored and the US rationale for demanding strict controls would be undercut.

- Meanwhile the crisis would appear to world opinion to have receded, and the pressure on the USSR to meet US demands would be reduced.

- At the same time, the Soviet missiles though in storage rather than on launchers would still be in Cuba and Moscow would still have bargaining value.

4. Quarantine

SECRET

0311507030

b7c
(c) b7c

067

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

(b)(1),
(a)(3)(S)

5. Verification

The Soviets apparently hope that by implementing half of the first phase of the removal without verification, they will be able to minimize US demands for further verification. The Soviets will almost certainly seek to reduce to a minimum the controls required in order to:

- (1) reduce Cuban opposition,
- (2) avoid setting a precedent which might be used against them in disarmament negotiations, and
- (3) prevent the further US intelligence gain that would result from observation of the act of dismantling.

However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets may invite US representatives to witness the bulldozing of revetments in order to vividly demonstrate their fulfillment of their part of the bargain. In so doing they would hope to convey the impression that such measures as inspection of other locations, inspection of the actual movement out of Cuba, overflights and continuing control over possible reintroduction of Soviet missiles were unnecessary.

6. Guarantees for Cuba

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(a)(3)(S)

Meanwhile Moscow propaganda continues playing up the theme of danger to Cuba, alleging US bad faith in the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of letters, and supporting Castro's five demands. Polyakov, Izvestiya's authoritative

SECRET

031130H7030

DECLASSIFIED

commentator, said on October 31 that fulfillment of these demands is necessary to guarantee Cuba's security.

7. Nikoyan Trip

Castro remained adamant in his opposition to all forms of inspection on Cuban territory, and indicated to U Thant that he had been embittered by Khrushchev's sending his October 28 letter to the President without first consulting him.

Nikoyan is en route to Cuba, apparently to cajole Castro into agreeing to an arrangement which the US might accept. Inclusion of Alikhanov (Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations) on the delegation suggests that additional economic aid may be forthcoming. References in Soviet propaganda to the effect that the USSR will not leave Cuba undefended suggest the possibility that Nikoyan may offer the Cubans a formal alliance; however, on balance it appears doubtful that Castro would value such an assurance at a time when he feels betrayed, or that the Soviets want to deepen and further formalize their military commitment.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

0315087030

069